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ON THE PORTABILITY OF
QUANTITATIVE SOFTWARE ESTIMATION MODELS
Abstract
Evidence in the literature indicates that the portability of currently
available quantitative software estimation models is poor. A primary
reason is that most models fail to account for managerial characteristics
of the software development environment; a set of factors that tend to
vary signinificantly from one organization to another. A major stumbling
block has been the inability to quantify the impact of managerial -type
factors on cost.
In this study, we take a first step towards rectifying this situation.
An extensive simulation model of the software development process is
developed and used to identify managerial factors that impact the cost of
software development, and to quantify the degree of that impact. Because
the areas identified are variables that the project manager can
objectively evaluate at the beginning of a software project, it should be
feasible to incorporate them in future cost estimation models. This, we
feel, would improve both their accuracy and portability.
Key Words : Software Estimation, Software Projects, Software Project
Management, System Dynamics, Simulation.
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Introduction
Software development cost and schedule estimation continues to be a
major difficulty in the management of software development [4]. While
several quantitative software estimation models have been developed and
widely publicized in the literature (e.g., [27] and [7]), still "...almost
no model can estimate the true cost of software with any degree of
accuracy" [24]. Furthermore, the portability of such models (i.e., in
maintaining a good level of estimation accuracy when utilized in a
different organization) has proven to be quite poor [5]. As a result, many
software development organizations do not seem to trust any of the
available quantitative models. A recent study of 30 organizations showed
that the models were used only to "check manual estimates" [37],
The significance of the problem was stated as follows:
Unable to estimate accurately, the manager can know with certainty
neither what resources to commit to an effort nor, in retrospect, how
well these resources were used. The lack of a firm foundation for
these two judgements can reduce programming management to a random
process in that positive control is next to impossible. This situation
often results in the budget overruns and schedule slippages that are
al 1 too common ... [15]
.
The thesis of this paper is that both the accuracy as well as the
portability of software estimation models can be improved by taking into
consideration not only the technical variables (e.g., source language,
y
computer hardware characteristics, database size, ... eTcT') as in most of
the current models, but, in addition, expl ici t1
y
to incorporate the
managerial and organizational characteristics of the environment.
Specifically, we identify a number of managerial variables that most
current models fail to "acknowledge," but which significantly influence
the cost of software development.
Mohanty's Experiment
We first report on an interesting experiment by Mohanty [24], which
demonstrates the weaknesses in current models. His objective was to
examine the extent to which 12 available quantitative software estimation
models produce the same cost estimate for a given project. In order to
specify his hypothetical software project, it was necessary to identify
the full set of factors that are collectively incorporated in the 12
models. Forty-nine factors were identified. They involved system size,
database size, system complexity, type of program, documentation,
technical environment (e.g., requirements definition, security, and
computer access), and an "other" category that includes such items as
miles traveled, reliability, and growth requirements.
The hypothetical project was then defined in terms of the identified
parameters. The project was chosen to be 35,000 machine-language
executable instructions. The cost estimates for the project are exhibited
in Figure 1. As this illustrates, the estimated cost varied from a low of
$352,500 (the Farr and Zagorski Model) to a high of $2,755,657 (the
Kustanowitz Model )
.
Two sources for the variations between the cost estimates were
suggested. The first related to the quality of the final product. The
second is environmental:
... That is, each model was developed for a cost data base collected
in a given company environment. This data base thus embodies the
specific nature of the organizational problems, work patterns, and
management approaches and practices. Where this data base is regressed
to derive coefficients for use in a given model, the model reflects













































Cost estimates for a software project in Mohanty's Experiment
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This view is supported by others in the literature {[12], [30], and
[5]).
An Integrated System Dynamics Model of Software Development
A major deficiency in much of the research to date on software project
management has been its inability to integrate our knowledge of the micro
components of the software development process such as scheduling,
progress measurement, and staffing to derive implications about the
behavior of the total socio-technical system in which the micro components
are embedded [31]. In the words of Jensen and Tonies [20]: "There is much
attention on individual phases and functions of the software development
sequence, but little on the whole lifecycle as an integral, continuous
process — a process that can and should be optimized."
The model we are presenting in this paper provides such an integrative
perspective. It integrates, as will be demonstrated in more detail later,
the multiple functions of the software development process, including both
the management-type functions (e.g., planning, control, staffing) as well
as the software production-type activities (e.g., design, coding,
reviewing, testing).
A second important feature of our modeling approach is the use of the
feedback principles of System Dynamics to structure and clarify the
complex web of dynamically interacting variables involved in the
development and management of software projects. Feedback is the process
in which an action taken by a person or thing will eventually affect that
person or thing. The significance and applicabilty of the feedback systems
concept to managerial systems has been substantiated by a large number of
7
studies [28]. For example, Weick [34] observes that,
The cause-effect relationships that exist in organizations are dense
and often circular. Sometimes these causal circuits cancel the
influences of one variable on another, and sometimes they amplify the
effects of one variable on another. It is the network of causal
relationships that impose many of the controls in organizations and
that stabilize or disrupt the organization. It is the patterns of
these causal links that account for much of what happens in
organizations. Though not directly visible, these causal patterns
account for more of what happens in organizations than do some of the
more visible elements such as machinery, timeclocks, ...
It is no wonder, then, that many software managers get into trouble
because they forget to think in circles. We mean this literally.
Managerial problems persist because managers continue to believe that
there are such things as unilateral causation, independent and dependent
variables, origins, and terminations.
The third distinctive aspect of our modeling approach is the
utilization of the computer simulation tools of System Dynamics to handle
the high complexity of the resulting integrative feedback model. The
behavior of systems of interconnected feedback loops often confounds
common intuition and analysis, even though the dynamic implications of
isolated loops may be reasonably obvious. The feedback structures of real
problems are often so complex that the behavior they generate over time
can usually be traced only by simulation.
Several authors (e.g.. [31]) have complained about the lack of tested
ideas in the software engineering field. Weiss [35] commented that in
software engineering it is remarkably easy to propose hypotheses and
remarkably difficult to test them. Accordingly, it is useful to seek
methods for testing software engineering hypotheses.
8
Unfortunately, controllecl experiments in the area of software
development tend to be costly and time consuming [25]. Furthermore, even
when it can be afforded the isolation of the effect and the evaluation of
the impact of any given practice within a large, complex and dynamic
project environment can be exceedingly difficult [18].
In addition to permitting less costly and less time-consuming
experimentation, simulation models make "perfectly" controlled
experimenation possible. Indeed:
The effects of different assumptions and environmental factors can be
tested. In the model system, unlike real systems, the effect of
changing one factor can be observed while all other factors are held
unchanged... Internally, the model provides complete control of the
system's organizational structure, its policies, and its sensitivities
to various events [17]
.
Overview of Model Structure
The model was developed on the basis of a battery of 27 field
interviews of software project managers in five software producing
organizations, supplemented by extensive empirical findings from the
literature. Figure 2 depicts the model's four subsystems, namely: (I) The
Human Resource Management Subsystem; (2) The Software Production
Subsystem; (3) The Control Subsystem; and (4) The Planning Subsystem. It
also shows some of the interrelatedness of the four subsystems. The model
integrates our knowledge of micro components (e.g., scheduling,
programming, productivity) into a more continuous view of the software
development process.
The Human Resource Management Subsystem captures the hiring, training,
assimilation, and transfer of the human resource. Such actions are not
carried out in vacuum, but are affected by the other subsystems; e.g., the

10
hiring rate is a function of the workforce level needed to complete the
project by a given date. Similarly available workforce has direct bearing
on the allocation of manpower among the different production activities.
The four main software production activities are: development, quality
assurance, rework, and testing. The development activity comprises both
the design and coding of the software. As it is developed, it is also
reviewed to detect any errors; e.g., with structured walkthroughs. Errors
detected through such activities are then reworked. But not all errors are
detected, some "escape" detection until the testing phase.
As progress is made, it is reported. A comparison of degree completed
to planned schedule is captured within the Control Subsystem. Once an
assessment of the project's status is made, it becomes an important input
to the planning function.
In the Planning Subsystem, initial project estimates are made and then
revised, when necessary, throughout the project's life. For example, to
handle a project that is perceived to be behind schedule, plans can be
revised to (among other things) hire more people, extend the schedule, or
do both.
A full description of the model and of its validation are provided
elsewhere ([1] and [3]). And in [2], we demonstrate the model's accuracy
in reproducing the dynamic behavior of a real software project.
Model Experimentation :
In a series of experiments, we tested and quantified the impact of
four-managerial type variables on the cost of software development. Two
address manpower acquisition and staffing considerations, while the other
two concern managerial judgement on the distribution of effort among the
software development activities. The four variables were selected with two
criteria in mind. The two criteria were proposed in [8]: objectivity and
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prospectiveness. According to these authors, software cost estimation
models should only include objective variables; this avoids allocating
variance to poorly calibrated subjective factors. Thus it is harder to
manipulate the model to obtain wanted results. Secondly, a model should
avoid the use of variables that cannot be quantified until the project is
complete.
Manpower-Acouisition and Staffing Variables :
The two model variables that address manpower-acquisition policy
issues are: (1) fractional time on job; and (2) the willingness to change
workforce level
.
Field interviews revealed differences in project staffing policies. In
some organizations project members were assigned full-time to a single
project, whereas at others, software developers were assigned to more than
one (usually two) [21]. In the model, this issue is captured by the
variable "Fractional Time on Job." For example, when project members are
assigned full-time to a project, the value of the "Fractional Time on Job"
would be set to 1 i.e., each project member contributes 1 man-day every
(working) day to the project. On the other hand, if project members
allocate, on the average, only 50% of their time to the project, the value
of the "Fractional Time on Job" would be set to 0.5.
To examine the impact of these two different staffing policies on
project cost, we defined the EXAMPLE software project for the simulation
experiment, and then conducted two simulation runs. (In the Appendix, a
parameter profile of the EXAMPLE software project is presented together
with its base case simulation run.) In the first, the value of the
"Fractional Time on Job" was set to 1, and in the second it was set to
0.5. The measure of the project cost we will use is the value of the total
number of man-days expended to complete the project. The results were as
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follows:
Fractional Time on Job Man-Davs
1.0 3,795
0.5 4,641
In other words, the policy of allocating project members half-time to
the project results in a 22% higher cost. The reason for this increase is
two-fold. First, there is a loss in productivity due to the increase in
the communication overhead. This factor accounts for approximately 90% of
the increase. The average staffing level of a project (in terms of
full-time equivalent employees) is typically determined by dividing the
estimated size of the project in man-days by the project's estimated
development time [7]. When the "Fractional Time on Job" is less than 1, an
upward adjustment is obvoiusly needed. For example, if a project's size is
1000 man-days and its scheduled duration is 200 days, the average staffing
level for full-time equivalent employees would be 5. But if employees are
assigned only half-time, then the staffing level would be raised to 10.
This increases the time lost on human communication, e.g., to resolve
questions [30]. In addition, the amount of project work itself usually
increases; e.g., in the form of more documentation, more modules, and more
interfaces [13]. The result is a decrease in productivity.
The second reason why the cost increases is because of an increase in
the training overhead. This factor accounts for the remaining 10% of the
increase. When new project members are recruited (from within the
organization or from the outside), they often pass through a project
orientation period. This training of newcomers is usually carried out by
the "old timers" ([29] and [36]). This overhead is, of course, costly,
because while (the oldti^er) is helping the new employee learn the job,
his own productivity on his other work is reduced [11]. This training
overhead is a function of the number of newcomers, not of the number of
equivalent full-time newcomers. In [19], when project members were
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assigned half-time on the project, the team size was doubled, which indeed
doubled the training overhead incurred on the project.
The second manpower-acquisition variable tested is the "Willingness to
Change Workforce." When deciding upon changes in the workforce level
(because the project is falling behind schedule) software project managers
typically consider a number of factors. One is the scheduled completion
date. As part of the continuous planning function management determines
the workforce level necessary to complete the project within the scheduled
time. In addition, consideration is given to the stability of the
workforce. Thus, before hiring new project members, management tries to
decide how long it will utilize the new members. Different firms weigh
this factor to various extents. In general, however, the relative weights
change with the stage of the project. Toward the end of the project there
is usually considerable reluctance to bring in new people, even though the
time and effort remaining might imply that more are needed. It would take
too much of the remaining project time to acquaint new people with the
mechanics of the project, integrate them into the team, and train them in
the necessary technical areas.
These managerial considerations are entered into the model with a
weight factor termed "Willingness to Change Workforce" (WCWF). It is a
variable that could assume values from to 1. When WCWF = 1, the
"Workforce Level Sought" would simply be set equal to the "Workforce Level
Perceived Needed;" i.e., management would be adjusting its workforce level
to finish on schedule, determined by dividing the amount of effort that
management perceives is still remaining by the time remaining to complete
the project. As WCWF moves towards 0, more and more weight would be given
to the stability of the workforce. And when WCWF is 0, the "Workforce
Level Sought" becomes equal to the "Current Workforce" i.e., management
attempts to maintain the workforce at its current level. A WCWF value
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between and 1, on the other hand, represents a situation where
management responds to schedule slippages by partially increasing the
workforce level (workforce level sought would be set to a value less than,
not equal to the workforce level perceived needed to complete the project
on the current schedule) and partially extending the current schedule to a
new date. Thus,
Workforce Level Sought = (Workforce Level Perceived Needed)*(WCWF) +
(Current Workforce)*(l-WCWF)
Note : The above formulation only applies when the value of the
"Workforce Level Perceived Needed" is larger than "Current Workforce,"
indicating a need for hiring more people. In cases where this is not true,
the "Workforce Level Sought" would be set to the lower value, and any
excessive employees transferred out of the project.
It is important to realize that the variable "Willingness to Change
Workforce" (WCWF) is an expression of a pol icy for managing projects. For
any specific project environment, the WCWF function can be derived on the
basis of interviews with project managers as well reviews of historical
project records.
The "Willingness to Change Workforce" (WCWF) curve depicted in
Figure 3 characterizes the workforce acquisition policy in one
organization studied, a large American minicomputer manufacturer. In the
early stages of the project when "Time Remaining" would generally be much
larger than the sum of the hiring and assimilation delays (the latter
being the time needed for a new team member to become fully productive),
WCWF is one; i.e., there is total willingness to adjust the size of the
workforce to whatever level is necessary to suit the scheduled completion
date. This inclination to respond to any schedule slippages in the early
phases of the project through adjustments in the workforce level rather











(Hiring Delay+Av. Assimilation Delay)
Figure 3
Willingness to Change Workforce (base case)
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pressures:
Once an original estimate is made, it's all too tempting to pass up
subsequent opportunities to estimate by simply sticking with your
previous numbers. This often happens even when you know your old
estimates are substantially off. There are a few different possible
explanations for this effect: 'It's too early to show slip' ... 'If I
re-estimate now, I risk having to do it again later (and looking bad
twice)' [14].
As the number of days perceived remaining drops below 1.5*(Hiring
Delay + Assimilation Delay), though, there is reluctance to increase the
workforce level. For example, if the "Hiring Delay" is 40 working days
(i.e., eight calendar weeks) and the "Assimilation Delay" is 80 working
days, then as "Time Remaining" drops below 180 working days, management
becomes reluctant to add new people, even though the effort remaining
might imply (at that point in the project) that more people are needed.
This reluctance, as mentioned above, stems from the realization that most
of these remaining days would be "wasted." When the "Time Remaining" drops
below 0.3*(Hiring Dalay + Assimilation Delay), the particular policy curve
of Figure 3 suggests that no more additions would be made to the project's
workforce. Thus, if the project is behind schedule, project management
would cope with project slippage through adjustment to the completion
date. We term this policy the base case.
One other manpower acquisition policy that we shall term policy (A),
can be defined as follows: At the initiation of the project, estimates are
made of the total effort in man-days (MD) and development time (TDEV).
Based on these, the staffing level is determined; i.e., by dividing MD by
TDEV. People are hired, usually to complement the core project team on
hand at the initiation of the project, until the desired staffing level is
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reached. Then, the workforce is maintained at that level, with new people
hired only to replace those who quit or are transferred. Such a policy was
also reported by Devenny [15] in his study of software cost estimation.
The simulation results of this policy, together with that of the base
run, are:
Manpower Acquisition Policy Man-Days Duration (Days)
Base Case 3,795 430
A 3,559 488
As the figures indicate, policy (A) leads to a 6% drop in cost.
However, this is achieved at the cost of a larger schedule slip, because
the project takes 13.5% more time to complete. Whether this tradeoff is
made consciously is not clear. However, by foregoing the flexibility of
adjusting the workforce level, this staffing policy leaves little room in
handling any project delays beyond translating them into completion
si ippages.
Under a third manpower acquisition policy we examined, policy (B),
project management is not only willing to adjust the workforce level
(e.g., to account for any initial underestimation error), but is willing
to continue making such adjustments further into the project life cycle
(that is, further than in the base case). This policy is adopted by one
growing software consulting company. The WCWF curve for policy (B) is
shown in Figure 4. The major difference between this and the base policy
of Figure 3 is that the denominator of the X-axis variable is simply the
"Hiring Delay" rather than the sum of the "Hiring Delay" and the
"Assimilation Delay." This, of course, means that policy (B) is a more
aggressive policy in terms of acquiring people. While in the base case
policy management is reluctant to increase the workforce level when the
perceived number of days reT^aining to complete the project drops below 1.5
*(Hiring Delay + Assimilation Delay), under policy (B) this happens much
18
A WCWF
0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.5 Time Remaining
Hiring Delay
Figure 4
Willingness to Change Workforce (Policy B]
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later in the project's lifecycle (i.e., when only 1.5*40=60 working days
are perceived remaining). This policy is justified, we were told, because
the firm is experiencing an impressive growth rate, fueled by a sizable
backlog of client assignments. Hiring new people into a project that is
"winding down" is, therefore, not inhibited by management since securing
the future utilization of the new people is almost always guaranteed.
The result of adopting such a policy in project EXAMPLE is shown
below, together (for the reader's convenience) with the results of both
the base case and policy (A).




As the figures indicate, cost in using policy (B) is 14% higher than
the base case and 21% higher than that of policy (A). On the other hand,
under policy (B) the project takes 13% less time to complete than the base
case, and almost 25% less time than when policy (A) is used. Both the
increase in the cost and the decrease in the duration can be attributed to
a single cause, namely, a higher workforce level that results from the
increased willingness to add people to the project.
Effort Distribution Variables :
In planning a software project, management not only provides estimates
for the project's total expenditure, it also plans the distribution of
this effort among the project's phases. Numerous authors have presented
figures indicating lifecycle resource distributions. A comparison of
several by McKeen [22], indicated that substantial differences do exist,
particularly in the coding and testing phases. Commenting on the
situation, he says: "A major conclusion ... is that we do not possess an
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adequate understanding of resource consumption behavior over the life
cycle development phases." He studied 32 software development projects,
and found no real support for typical or dominant development profiles at
all.
We now examine the impact of the distribution of effort among the
project's phases in our prototype on project cost. The model has two
effort distribution parameters. The first concerns the allocation of the
project's estimated man-days among the model's two major phases:
development (design and coding) and system testing. In the base case, 80%
of the effort is allocated to development and 20% to testing. The second
parameter is the "Planned Fraction of Manpower for Quality Assurance." In
the base case this is set to 15% i.e., 15% of the development effort is
allocated (in the project's plan) for QA activities during the design and
coding stages.
For our simulation, we selected a second effort distribution profile
that was used in a major auto manufacturer, the 40-20-40 effort
distribution profile i.e., 40% for preliminary and detailed design, 20%
for coding, and 40% for testing. We should note that this 40-20-40 rule is
perhaps the most widely touted rule-of-thumb on the distribution of effort
([20], [10], and [26]). As for QA, the particular organization's software
project teams allocated, on average, 20% of the development effort to
quality assurance.
The result of running project EXAMPLE with this new effort
distribution profile, termed (C), were:




Thus, a change in the effort distribution profile from the base case
to profile (C) leads to a 17% increase in cost. Several factors
contributed to this. The most significant factor is the increase in the
cost of the development phase.
Consider the sequence of steps in planning a project's various
activities (e.g., [7]). First, total man-days is estimated. Based on this,
the schedule is calculated. The two estimes are then used to determine the ^
average staff size. And allocations are then made to the project's various
lifecycle activities. Effort distribution decisions typically come after,
not before, the project's schedule is made. Thus if two different project
managers were to run the same software project and if the only thing that
differentiates the two is their policies on distributing the effort, both
would still initiate their project with the same global estimates. It is
exactly this type of scenario that we attempted to capture in our
simulation. Thus, in both runs the project's total man-day estimate as
well as the scheduled completion date remain the same. But since in
profile C a lower fraction of the manpower is devoted to development work
(because of the increased allocation to QA), a larger team will be
required to meet the schedule. A larger team means larger training and
communication overheads, and hence the larger development cost.
A Final Experiment
In the final experiment, we examined the combined effect of the four
variables on project cost. This is achieved by the following four
adjustments:
1. Setting the value of the "Fractional Time on Job" to 0.5. (The




2. The "Willingness to Change Workforce" is formulated in terms of
the "Hiring Delay," yielding a more aggressive manpower
acquisition policy. [In the base case it is formulated in terms
of the (Hiring Delay + Assimilation Delay).]
3. Allocation of effort among the development and testing phases is
set at 60% development (design and coding) and 40% testing. (In
the base case it is 80-20.)
4. The "Planned Fraction of Manpower for QA" is set at 20%. (In the
base case 15%.
)
The result of this different set of managerial policies is a total
cost of 7,316 man-days. That is, a cost that is almost double the base
case cost of 3,795 man-days.
Conclusion
The implication of the results is clear: because managerial policies
vary from software development organization to another and because they
impact the cost of software development, the portability of software cost
estimation models would be improved if such variables are expl icitly
incorporated in the models' formulations.
Heretofore, the impact that a company's managerial environment can
have on its software development costs has not been quantified. We feel
that our work produced three useful results. First, we have established
that the impact is significant; specifically, we have shown that the
combined effect of four managerial variables can increase the cost of a
software project by at least a factor of 2. Secondly, by quantifying the
23
individual variables' impacts, we have taken a first step towards the
incorporation of such mangerial variables in the formulation of software
estimation models. Such an enhancement would undoubtedly improve the
portability of the models. Finally, we have identified four aspects of the
managerial environment of software development that are significant
determinants of software development cost, and which are, therefore,
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